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On the Origins of the Modern Libertarian 
Legal Movement 
Roger Pilon* 
The growing influence of the modern libertarian legal movement in 
America and beyond was no better illustrated recently than during the two-
year run-up to the Supreme Court’s “Obamacare” decision, which came 
down on the Court’s final day last June.1 Marginalized for years by many 
conservatives2—to say nothing of the long dominant liberal establishment 
that dismissed their arguments out of hand3—libertarians offered a 
principled vision4 that resonated not only with judges who over that period 
decided several challenges to the Act’s massive expansion of government,5 
but with a large part of the American public as well—and, in the end, with 
a majority on the High Court itself.6 And why not: The vision was 
grounded in the nation’s First Principles. 
The movement did not come out of nowhere, however. Its roots are 
deep and often subtle, the product of decades of thought and work by 
philosophers, economists, lawyers, and others, all toward securing the legal 
foundations for liberty. An entire volume would be needed to adequately 
 
 * Roger Pilon is vice president for legal affairs at the Cato Institute, founder and director of 
Cato’s Center for Constitutional Studies, and publisher of the Cato Supreme Court Review. He holds 
Cato’s B. Kenneth Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies. 
 1 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2 For the most recent example, see J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012). 
 3 Among countless examples, see Akhil Reed Amar, Op-Ed., Constitutional Showdown, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at A17. 
 4 See ROBERT A. LEVY, THE CASE AGAINST PRESIDENT OBAMA’S HEALTH CARE REFORM: A 
PRIMER FOR NONLAWYERS (2011); Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual 
Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010); Ilya Shapiro, A 
Long, Strange Trip: My First Year Challenging the Constitutionality of Obamacare, 6 FLA. INT’L U. L. 
REV. 29 (2010).  
 5 See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Att’y. Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 
(11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 
1235 (2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (2011).  
 6 See James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act’s Mandated Medicaid 
Expansion: The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, 2011 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67 
(2012); David B. Rivkin Jr. et al., NFIB v. Sebelius and the Triumph of Fig-Leaf Federalism, 2011–
2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31 (2012).  
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treat the origins and course of the movement.7 In the limited compass I’m 
afforded here I will be able simply to scratch the surface, touching on some 
of the main themes, actors, and events—largely from my own perspective 
and experience as one who was there toward the beginning, seeing and 
living events that younger members of the movement today have only read 
or heard about, if that. My aim is to give those members at least a glimpse 
of that history, the better to appreciate the value of the work that lies before 
them. 
I.  BACKGROUND: THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 
The place to begin, however, is with the context from which the 
movement arose. And for that we need to reach far back: to the natural law 
of antiquity, grounded in reason; to the Roman law, with its development 
of property and contract; to the English common law, especially, its judges 
drawing on reason and custom to craft the theory of rights, captured in the 
positive law of an evolving Magna Carta; to John Locke, who would 
conceptualize those rights as natural rights and order them systematically 
within a larger theory of moral and political legitimacy; and to America’s 
Founders and Framers, including the Framers of the Civil War 
Amendments, who would institutionalize the principles that emerged from 
that long tradition.8 Covering first private then public law, those principles 
and the regime the Framers secured over time spoke simply of individual 
liberty under limited constitutional government—the vision that inspired 
the modern libertarian movement, especially in its legal manifestations. 
As with all human institutions, the regime that followed from those 
principles was far from perfect. But it enabled unprecedented liberty and 
prosperity for countless millions already living in America as well as those 
drawn here by the principles. With the rise of Progressivism, however, the 
vision faced a frontal assault, grounded in the idea that government 
planners could better order human affairs than could individuals pursuing 
their own ends as if guided by Adam Smith’s invisible hand.9 So attractive 
was that collectivist idea, especially among Western elites, that by the 
middle of the twentieth century there were few advocates of the older view 
to be found, at least among the elites who would come to run the affairs of 
nations. And that is where our story begins, first with the slow reemergence 
of the classical view, then with the more specifically legal cast of it. 
 
 7 On the broader conservative legal movement, see STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008); BRINGING 
JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE: THE STORY OF THE FREEDOM-BASED PUBLIC INTEREST LAW MOVEMENT (Lee 
Edwards ed., 2004). 
 8 For a learned overview of this history, see Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background 
of American Constitutional Law, (pts. 1 & 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-1929). For the Civil 
War Amendments, see Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of 
Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361 (1993). 
 9 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006). 
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II.  FROM OUT OF THE ASHES: ANSWERING THE NEW DEAL 
No event precisely marks the rebirth of modern libertarianism10—
remnants of the classical view endured, to be sure—and its specifically 
legal aspect would emerge only in time from a mélange of writings by 
economists, philosophers, political theorists, lawyers, literary figures, 
journalists, and others, all part of a broadly “conservative” response to the 
modern liberalism that dominated the mid-century world of ideas. But a 
useful marker is of course the 1944 publication of F.A. Hayek’s The Road 
to Serfdom, a withering critique of central planning. An Austrian economist 
but in truth a polymath, Hayek would go on to publish broadly 
philosophical works—The Constitution of Liberty in 1960 and the three-
volume Law, Legislation, and Liberty in the 1970s, among much else—but 
over that stretch a great deal more would unfold to bring into being the 
modern American conservative movement in which libertarianism could be 
found growing, if not always comfortably. 
Here, let me simply list but a few of those developments as they 
underpinned and eventually led to the modern libertarian legal movement 
that began to emerge in the mid-1970s. The Austrian and Chicago 
economists such as Hayek and Milton Friedman were seminal libertarian 
influences, of course, as were the philosophical novels of Ayn Rand for 
many, and the variety of writers who found a sympathetic home after 
William F. Buckley Jr. established his National Review in 1955.11 But as 
important as those and other such individuals were—too many to recount 
here—the institutions that emerged during those early years were perhaps 
even more important, starting with the Mount Pelerin Society that Hayek 
founded in 1947; the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE), founded a 
year earlier by Leonard Read, which in the mid-1950s would begin 
publishing The Freeman as we know it today; the Intercollegiate Society of 
Individualists, founded by Frank Chodorov in 1953, which would later 
become the rather more conservative Intercollegiate Studies Institute, but 
not before helping to launch the New Individualist Review12 at the 
University of Chicago in 1961; the Philadelphia Society, established in 
 
 10 For the theory and history of libertarianism, see respectively, DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: 
A PRIMER (1997), and THE LIBERTARIAN READER: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS FROM 
LAO-TZU TO MILTON FRIEDMAN (David Boaz ed., 1997). For the recent history, see BRIAN DOHERTY, 
RADICALS FOR CAPITALISM: A FREEWHEELING HISTORY OF THE MODERN AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN 
MOVEMENT (2007). 
 11 For a useful anthology of some twenty-four authors from this early period, see AMERICAN 
CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (William F. Buckley Jr. ed., Transaction 
Publishers 2011), originally published sub nom. DID YOU EVER SEE A DREAM WALKING? AMERICAN 
CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (William F. Buckley Jr. ed., 1970). For my 
introduction to the 2011 edition, which places the volume in a contemporary context, see Roger Pilon, 
Introduction to the Transaction Edition (2011), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/books/Pilon-
Buckley-Book-Intro.pdf. 
 12 In 1981, in 991 pages, the Liberty Fund Press republished the entire run of the New 
Individualist Review, from April 1961 to Winter 1968. See NEW INDIVIDUALIST REVIEW: VOLS. 1–5, 
(Liberty Press ed., 1981). 
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1964, whose annual meetings drew together a variety of conservative and 
libertarian intellectuals for debate and discussion; and, most important for 
our purposes, the Institute for Humane Studies, founded by F.A. “Baldy” 
Harper in 1961, which in time would become a significant force in bringing 
the modern libertarian legal movement into being. Also to be noted of 
course is the establishment of several conservative and libertarian think 
tanks, most prominently the Heritage Foundation in 1973 and the Cato 
Institute in 1977. 
The importance of those and similar institutions cannot be overstated: 
They served to stimulate the debate that would eventually change the 
climate of ideas, bringing the classical liberal vision back to the fore. In 
those early years, however, to oversimplify considerably in the interest of 
economy, the domestic policy debate on the Right tended to involve 
cultural conservatives and economic libertarians more than the focused 
legal and constitutional debates we think of today. Conservatives and 
libertarians, sometimes at loggerheads, more often together, were working 
out responses to the liberalism that had dominated public discourse since 
the Progressive Era, overwhelmingly since the New Deal. But insofar as 
law was at issue, the early debate eventually took two main tracks. First, 
economic consequentialists sought to show that the liberals’ programs, far 
from achieving their purported ends of helping the poor and the like, 
accomplished just the opposite results. From that effort emerged the law 
and economics movement, emanating from the University of Chicago 
under such early proponents as Aaron Director, Ronald Coase, Henry 
Manne, Richard Posner, and many others. But second, quite apart from that 
effort there arose another critique of the liberal legal order, a conservative 
attack on the “rights revolution” of the Warren Court and the “judicial 
activism” that many conservatives thought they saw being practiced by that 
Court and, later, by the Burger Court as well.13 
That brings us closer to our main subject. But before reaching it we 
should note that, in an important sense, both the libertarian law and 
economics consequentialists and the conservative critics urging judicial 
deference to the political branches were operating within the political 
confines instituted by the New Deal’s “constitutional revolution”—a 
Congress, freed from the doctrine of enumerated powers, exercising 
effectively unlimited power; an executive branch increasingly infused with 
“legislative” powers delegated to it by Congress; and courts unwilling to 
engage in checking the vast redistributive and regulatory schemes that were 
flowing from the political branches and the states (except, later on, when 
those schemes implicated certain “fundamental” rights).14 For their part in 
 
 13 This latter strain was captured much later and most prominently by Robert H. Bork in his book, 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). For a critique, see Roger 
Pilon, Constitutional Visions, REASON, Dec. 1990, at 39, and Roger Pilon, Op-Ed., Rethinking Judicial 
Restraint, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1991, at A10. 
 14 I discussed this revolution more fully in ROGER PILON, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 
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that post-New Deal constitutional milieu, the law and economics people 
sought to show legislators not that their efforts were without constitutional 
authority but, as noted just above, that they were counterproductive or 
perhaps inefficient; but insofar as those consequentialists brought their 
arguments to the courts, as they increasingly did, they were often seen as 
urging judges to make policy calls concerning economic efficiency, which 
judges have no authority to do. By contrast, conservatives were criticizing 
the Court not for invoking economic values like efficiency but for invoking 
social values, especially “evolving” liberal social values, thus to make 
policy judgments that should be left to the legislative branch, they said.15 
Yet in neither case did either camp come to grips with the challenge posed 
by the New Deal constitutional revolution itself. Both camps railed, mostly, 
against the Leviathan that the revolution had enabled; but neither seemed 
willing to tackle it at its core. 
III.  THE MODERN LIBERTARIAN LEGAL MOVEMENT EMERGES 
Enter, therefore, the modern libertarian legal movement, animated by 
liberty and hence by the need to revive the constitutional principles that had 
secured it, which the New Deal Court had ignored as it opened the 
constitutional floodgates, allowing the modern welfare state to pour 
through. Not that the new movement did not draw from the two legal 
strains just outlined: law and economics consequentialism has a role to play 
in adjudication, of course, especially in line-drawing contexts involving 
nuisance, risk, and the like; and the conservatives were often right in 
critiquing the Court’s activism, even if they often misidentified or 
overstated the problem. But they were surely wrong in calling for far-
reaching judicial deference to the political branches.16 
In fact, it was precisely that conservative call for judicial restraint and, 
even more, the underlying criticism of the Court’s “rights-revolution” that 
sparked my own interest in pursuing the issues more deeply. After all, I 
thought, wasn’t the nation founded in the name of rights—natural rights, 
which conservatives dismissed as no business for the courts? And wasn’t it 
the duty of the courts, in the name of such rights, to protect individuals 
against majoritarian tyranny? Still, I paused, because the conservative 
critique and those questions were arising in the context of a galloping 
 
FROM LIMITED GOVERNMENT TO LEVIATHAN (2005), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/CT05.pdf. 
 15 I discussed this strain more fully in Roger Pilon, Lawless Judging: Refocusing the Issue for 
Conservatives, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 5 (2001), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/pilon_gtwnfs_lawlessjudging.pdf. 
 16 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Activism of the Right: A Mistaken and Futile Hope, in 
LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 65, 66 67 (Ellen Frankel 
Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990) ("The Constitution places very few restrictions on the exercise of 
the federal government's enumerated powers . . . . As a result, examples of enacted law clearly in 
violation of the Constitution are extremely difficult to find."). For a much earlier version of this view, 
see L. Brent Bozell, The Unwritten Constitution, in AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 11, at 52–75.  
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welfare state at home—Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society—and an 
intellectual climate that called for greater protection for “social and 
economic rights”—welfare rights—both at home and abroad,17 which 
hardly seemed consistent with the Framers’ plan for limited government. 
And so I, and others too who at the time were studying philosophy, 
dove more deeply into the theory of the matter, especially the theory of 
rights. And as luck would have it, long dormant normative theory was just 
then starting to reemerge in Anglo-American analytical philosophy. Two 
books in particular, both by Harvard philosophers, animated our thinking: 
John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, which arrived in 1971 and was generally 
understood as an apology for the modern welfare state, and Robert 
Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, which appeared in 1974 as a critique 
of Rawls and, more fully, as a sophisticated defense of libertarianism and 
limited government. But Nozick had erected his argument on the 
assumption that people had rights, which meant that there was a good deal 
of more fundamental work to be done—a project that I and others were 
only too willing to take on. In my case, it culminated finally in 1979 in a 
doctoral dissertation at Chicago entitled A Theory of Rights: Toward 
Limited Government, which drew on everything from Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics to Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” to my mentor 
Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality. Others, too, from the mid-1970s and 
beyond were at work establishing the philosophical foundations for liberty 
and limited government—through the Liberty Fund in Indianapolis, at the 
Reason Foundation in Los Angeles, the Pacific Institute for Public Policy 
Research and the Cato Institute (at that time) in San Francisco, the Social 
Philosophy and Policy Center in Bowling Green, Ohio, and elsewhere. 
But the lawyers also were at work at their end of the project, and none 
more productive or insightful than the man who arrived across the Midway 
a year after I got to Chicago, Richard Epstein. No stranger to philosophy—
his undergraduate major at Columbia, my own alma mater—Epstein was at 
the time developing his theory of strict liability in torts, which dovetailed 
nicely with the Lockean understanding of rights, even as it contrasted with 
his colleague Richard Posner’s negligence approach to torts. We struck up 
a collaborative relationship that has continued to this day,18 beginning with 
my 1976 review19 of his first four tort essays,20 placing them in a Hayekian 
and Nozickian context. The Institute for Humane Studies (IHS) had 
commissioned the piece for their Law & Liberty, which reached some 
 
 17 See Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE 
RIGHTS OF MAN 47 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1967); Inga Markovits, Socialist vs. Bourgeois Rights—An 
East-West German Comparison, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1978). 
 18 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 9. 
 19 Roger Pilon, Liberty and the Law of Tort, 2 L. & LIBERTY 1 (1976). 
 20 Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1973); Richard A. 
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and 
Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, 
Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975). 
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8,000 lawyers, judges, and scholars, I was told. And right there is a crucial 
piece of the story. 
Located at the time in Menlo Park, California, next door to Stanford, 
and led by Leonard Liggio, a historian, and Davis Keeler, a lawyer who 
headed up their Law & Liberty project, IHS and its people had an 
exceptionally keen appreciation of the need to establish not simply the 
economic arguments for liberty, including economic liberty, but the moral 
and legal arguments as well. Thus, even before I’d finished my dissertation 
they put me and many others on the speaking circuit, spreading the ideas 
that were the beginnings of what in time would constitute “the movement.” 
One such effort stands out: it was a 1979 conference in San Diego on the 
theory of rights, underwritten by the Liberty Fund, which I organized 
through IHS at a time when I was teaching at the Emory University Law 
School. The conference, examining the theory of rights systematically, 
drew together some of the leading scholars on the subject. Its proceedings 
and more were published that year in a special edition of the Georgia Law 
Review,21 copies of which were then used for years thereafter by IHS in its 
teaching and training programs for budding and newly minted libertarian 
academics, including law professors, who needed all the help they could 
get to penetrate the too often hostile academic walls. Those kinds of 
multiplier effects were crucial for building a movement. 
But others, too, were engaged in the same kinds of efforts. Thus a 
young Harvard Law student, Randy Barnett, himself a philosophy 
undergraduate major at Northwestern, was exploring the criminal law side 
of things with a conference he organized on the subject and an important 
essay on restitution that followed in 1977 in Ethics, published by the 
University of Chicago.22 And on the constitutional side, the late Bernard 
Siegan, another Chicago product who taught for years at the University of 
San Diego School of Law and attended that 1979 IHS rights conference, 
was at work at that time on his much needed Economic Liberties and the 
Constitution, published in 1980, also by Chicago. The mid- to late-’70s was 
a fertile period for developing the foundations for what would become the 
modern libertarian legal movement. 
But it would take sustained effort to become a true movement, to say 
nothing of a successful one. Fortunately, that effort was forthcoming, 
although the events that went into it are so varied and numerous that I can 
mention only a few—and again, only those with which I am most familiar. 
They begin, in the 1980s, with the election of Ronald Reagan and the 
subsequent appointment to the bench of numerous judges and justices, 
many of whom came from the legal academy or were otherwise conversant 
with the developing intellectual currents as they pertained to the law. But 
 
 21 Symposium, Perspectives on Rights, 13 GA. L. REV. 1117 (1979). 
 22 Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279 (1977). 
But see Roger Pilon, Criminal Remedies: Restitution, Punishment, or Both?, 88 ETHICS 348 (1978). 
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the differences between conservatives and libertarians were lying just 
below the surface, so for those of us in the libertarian camp, especially on 
the question of the proper role of the courts, it was a matter of charting a 
slow but methodical course aimed at changing the climate of ideas to one 
that would be more sympathetic to the idea that judges should be more 
engaged in defending constitutional liberties than most conservatives at the 
time, fearing judicial activism, were inclined to support. To accomplish 
that, quite simply, we got involved—with our fellow conservatives, and 
with the Left as well, where doing so would advance our ideas. 
Thus, just after the 1980 elections I worked with George Pearson, at 
that time with Koch Industries, to help plan the agenda for the annual 
meeting of the Philadelphia Society, which took place in early April 1981 
near the start of the Reagan administration that I would be joining only 
weeks later. The subject of the meeting was the philosophy of law. By 
design, my own address at the meeting, subsequently published by the then 
quite conservative Intercollegiate Studies Institute,23 gently called into 
question the conservatives’ approach to the courts. Those efforts to work 
with people of different views continued, but so did efforts to refine our 
work among ourselves while at the same time promoting it to others. A 
good example was Cato’s 1984 conference on “Economic Liberties and the 
Judiciary,” the outline for which I had sketched on a paper napkin a year 
earlier over lunch with Ed Crane, Cato’s president, and Jim Dorn, editor of 
the Cato Journal. At that conference we reached across the aisle in at least 
one instance, with the spirited opening debate between then-Judge Antonin 
Scalia and Richard Epstein, whose response to Scalia’s defense of judicial 
restraint was somewhat short of gentle. 
Here too there were multiplier effects. The Scalia-Epstein debate was 
soon published as a pamphlet by the conservative American Enterprise 
Institute, while the entire conference proceedings were published in the 
Cato Journal a year later24—and republished two years after that by the 
George Mason University Press with a foreword, “The Judiciary and the 
Constitution,” by Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.25 Meanwhile, the Cato Journal edition garnered invitations 
to Bernie Siegan and me to speak on the subject of economic liberties and 
the judiciary at the ABA convention’s 1987 showcase program celebrating 
the Bicentennial of the Constitution. And to top it all off, my ABA speech, 
published subsequently in The Freeman,26 received the Bicentennial 
Commission’s Benjamin Franklin Award, presented to me in 1989 by 
recently retired Chief Justice Warren Burger—all this from that paper 
napkin! Multiplier effects indeed! 
 
 23 Roger Pilon, On the Foundations of Justice, 17 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 3 (1981).  
 24 Symposium, Economic Liberties and the Judiciary, 4 CATO J. 661 (1985). 
 25 ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987). 
 26 Roger Pilon, On the Foundations of Economic Liberty, 38 THE FREEMAN 338 (1988).  
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There were many other such events during the 1980s, of course, but 
doubtless none was more important than the 1982 creation of the Federalist 
Society, which has grown exponentially since then. For three decades, first 
through law school student chapters, then through lawyers chapters and 
practice groups, and over time through several other means, not least its 
annual student and lawyer conventions, the society has encouraged and 
facilitated a robust exchange of ideas through which libertarians have been 
able to present their views to an increasingly receptive audience. 
Considerably more conservative than libertarian at its inception, the society 
and its officers were nonetheless admirably open to a variety of ideas, the 
central one being that truth will eventually prevail. Thus it has hosted 
countless events featuring libertarian themes—such as its own symposium 
on “Constitutional Protections of Economic Liberty,” held at the George 
Mason University School of Law in 1987.27 And numerous books setting 
out various aspects of the libertarian legal vision, books by Richard 
Epstein, Randy Barnett, Gary Lawson, Chip Mellor, Clint Bolick, Robert 
A. Levy, David Bernstein, Walter Olson, and others, have enjoyed a warm 
reception at Federalist Society events, as a result of which the society is 
considerably more libertarian today, especially in its younger ranks, than it 
was in its early years. 
Again, therefore, it is the institutions that have been so crucial for 
advancing the ideas of the individuals who have worked in and through 
them. For that reason, when I left the Reagan administration toward its 
conclusion in 1988 it was to establish Cato’s Center for Constitutional 
Studies, the purpose of which was to help change the climate of ideas to 
one more conducive to liberty under limited constitutional government. For 
nearly twenty-five years now, through books, monographs, op-eds, 
conferences, forums, lectures, amicus briefs, media appearances, and, 
especially, the annual Cato Supreme Court Review, we have worked to 
bring that change about—mostly with others, such as with our friends at the 
Institute for Justice,28 which came on the scene a few years after we 
arrived. And we have seen that change come about—slowly and haltingly, 
to be sure, but clearly too, as in the Court’s last Term. When judges finding 
Obamacare “a bridge too far” cite James Madison, assuring skeptics, in 
Federalist 45, that the powers of the new government would be “few and 
defined,” that is a change worth noting, and worth celebrating as well.  
 
 27 Symposium, Constitutional Protections of Economic Activity, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 
(1988). 
 28 The Institute for Justice now has a Center for Judicial Engagement, under the direction of 
senior attorney Clark Neily, dedicated to encouraging courts to enforce constitutional limits on 
government. Center for Judicial Engagement, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/cje (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
Do Not Delete 4/9/2013 9:50 PM 
264 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:2 
CONCLUSION 
Twenty-five years and more ago, most conservatives had made their 
peace with the New Deal Court’s rejection of the very centerpiece of the 
Constitution, the doctrine of enumerated powers, from which the document 
derives such legitimacy as it can have as positive law. “A lost cause,” they 
said. Their concern instead, from fears about judicial activism, was that 
courts might recognize rights not enumerated in the document. Yet the 
plain text of the Constitution, together with its structure, should make it 
clear to any textualist that countless rights, only a few of which could have 
been enumerated in the document, are nevertheless recognized by and 
hence “in” the Constitution because, as it plainly says, they are “retained by 
the people”—and you cannot “retain” what you do not first have to be 
retained. Thus the fundamental importance of understanding the theory of 
rights that has stood behind the Constitution from before the time the Bill 
of Rights made explicit what was always implicit in the doctrine of 
enumerated powers—that where there is no power there is a right, 
belonging either to the states (as powers) or to the people.  
At a second ABA convention showcase program, this one in 1991 
celebrating the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights, Randy Barnett and I 
addressed both of those issues—both the powers and the rights issues—in 
speeches we gave on “The Forgotten Ninth and Tenth Amendments.”29 In 
the years since, the limits imposed by both enumerated powers and 
enumerated and unenumerated rights have been rediscovered—not entirely, 
to be sure, far from it—but in ways we could only have imaged decades 
ago. There is much more to be done, but the foundations for doing it are 
now in place. 
Yet those foundations are hardly new. They have been refined 
substantially, for sure, and that is no small matter. But they rest on 
principles that have been understood over the ages, even if too often 
forgotten or ignored over the past century.  Progressives thought they could 
improve the lot of mankind by ordering vast areas of life through law. 
America’s Founders knew better. They understood that liberty, under the 
rule of law, was the path to both prosperity and dignity. That is the path the 
modern libertarian legal movement is taking. 
 
*  *  * 
ADDENDUM 
After I had sent my symposium essay in to the Chapman Law Review, 
Professor Todd Zywicki was kind enough to send me his essay for this 
symposium30 with the idea that I might wish to respond since it took a 
 
 29 Roger Pilon, The Forgotten Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 13 CATO POL’Y REP. 1 (1991). 
 30 Todd J. Zywicki, Libertarianism, Law and Economics, and the Common Law, 16 CHAP. L. 
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somewhat different position than my own. I do wish to, briefly. Before 
continuing here, however, the reader should first read Professor Zywicki’s 
essay below. 
As will be seen, Zywicki’s main aim is to distinguish libertarian legal 
theory from the common law and modern law and economics, despite their 
vast commonalities, and in the process to explain how he himself moved 
gradually from the former to the latter as the sounder approach to legal 
questions. Granting that the common law and law and economics are not 
exactly alike, he focuses on those few occasions where he believes they 
deviate from libertarian theory, which  
has traditionally been deontological and normatively-oriented, typically 
grounded in natural rights theory and reasoning to normative statements about 
the content of the law. Law and economics, by contrast, purports to be foremost a 
positive theory of the common law, while also providing a normative 
justification for the common law as well (namely, social wealth maximization as 
a normative value).31 
And he takes as his libertarian foil a 1982 Cato Journal essay by 
Murray Rothbard,32 the libertarian economist who was a prolific writer on 
all manner of subjects right up to his death in 1995. 
Rothbard’s fecundity aside, I would note first that while he may be a 
particularly useful foil for his having argued directly against the law and 
economics approach, there are many in the normative libertarian law 
tradition, as I noted above,33 who take a broader view than Rothbard did, 
finding a place for both the common law and the law and economics 
approaches within the underlying libertarian theory.34 In fact, not only do 
the rights-based libertarian and efficiency-based law and economics 
approaches most often reach the same conclusions, but properly related 
they complement each other, as we will see shortly. 
But second, in explicating Rothbard’s—and “the libertarian”—
approach to “allocating” rights and liability in a nuisance context—his 
main focus—Zywicki charges Rothbard with “retreating” and eventually 
with “drift[ing] quite far from his initial premise that any physical invasion 
of land is an abatable nuisance and anything else is not actionable.”35 Yet a 
careful reading of Rothbard’s essay, including passages Zywicki himself 
quotes, will show that Rothbard, as he goes along, is simply “refining” his 
 
REV. 309 (2013). 
 31 Id. at 309. 
 32 Murray Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, 2(1) CATO JOURNAL 55–99 (1982). 
 33 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 34 Three years before Rothbard’s essay appeared, in fact, I myself argued for conclusions not 
unlike those Zywicki urges, though within a rights-based libertarian normative context, not an 
efficiency context. See Roger Pilon, Ordering Rights Consistently: Or What We Do and Do Not Have 
Rights To, 13 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1193–96 (1979); Roger Pilon, Corporations and Rights: On Treating 
Corporate People Justly, 13 GA. L. REV. 1245, 1332–39 (1979). See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (2008). 
 35 Zywicki, supra note 30, at 314. 
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“concept of invasion to mean not just boundary crossing, but boundary 
crossings that in some way interfere with the owner’s use or enjoyment of 
this property. What counts,” Rothbard concludes, “is whether the senses of 
the property owner are interfered with.”36 Thus, in defining property rights 
and setting liability rules, Rothbard would allow the “invasion” of radio 
waves or airplane flights at 35,000 feet, but not such standard nuisances as 
noise, odors, vibrations, and the like, at least if they are above a level that 
interferes with the owner’s quiet enjoyment of his rights.37 
Seizing on Rothbard’s refinement of his position, Zywicki next brings 
us closer to his own thesis, that the Coase Theorem38 is the better approach 
to nuisance disputes: 
Thus, despite his best efforts to avoid Coase, Rothbard has in fact implicitly 
come to concede the core premise that underlies the Coase Theorem—that what 
matters are incompatible and competing uses of scarce resources, and as a result, 
costs are reciprocal. It is only because both parties want to use the same scarce 
resource that incompatible uses arise.39 
. . . . 
Despite his best efforts to articulate simple bright-line rules, Rothbard’s clear 
rules inevitably collapse under the weight of a multitude of ad hoc exceptions. 
But the myriad of exceptions illustrates the central problem—it is precisely the 
problem of incompatible uses that gives rise to the need to define property rights 
in the first place . . . . If the problem is incompatible uses among people then 
there is no obvious reason (as Rothbard implicitly admits) that it must be 
intrinsically tied to particular parcels of land or that the concept of physical 
invasion takes on some particular normative primacy.40 
Having reduced the matter to incompatible uses, the solution Zywicki 
(and Coase) offer to this dilemma then follows naturally. Where there are 
low transaction costs, how a court allocates the rights does not matter, 
because either way the parties can bargain to an allocation of rights that 
maximizes total wealth. But where transaction costs are high, the initial 
allocation of rights might well matter, because the parties, for any number 
of reasons, may be unable to negotiate an efficient solution. In the stock 
example, a plaintiff suffering small losses from the actions of a defendant 
will seek to enjoin those actions, the effect of which, if the injunction is 
issued, will impose huge losses on the defendant. In such cases, Zywicki 
argues, “the law should try to replicate the bargain that the parties likely 
 
 36 Id. 
 37 Regrettably, Rothbard sees no place for defining those levels through public, statutory law, 
even in large number contexts like automobile pollution. At the same time, after citing Rothbard to the 
effect that supersensitive plaintiffs do not get relief (“Those who have a special desire for quiet, 
Rothbard observes, must build their own soundproof room.”), Zywicki then implies that Rothbard does 
not take that position (“Nor would nuisance arise [on the Rothbard view] if, for example, Mr. Burns [in 
Zywicki’s example] only had a normal, and not a highly sensitive, sense of smell.”) Id. at 315.  
 38 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 39 Zywicki, supra note 30, at 314. 
 40 Id. at 315. 
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would have struck had they been able to sit down and bargain out the terms, 
but are unable to do so because of the high transaction costs.”41 
Well what is wrong with that approach? Not a lot, really, assuming we 
can approximate individual and social costs—no small assumption. But we 
are not home free yet. First, Zywicki writes that “what matters” is that we 
have incompatible and competing uses of scarce resources. But clearly, 
more than that matters. In particular, causality matters. And the efficiency 
approach effectively ignores that issue as it considers alternative ways to 
“allocate” rights and liability. Thus, in the first of Zywicki’s examples it is 
the polluting vaccine factory, not its downstream victim, that is causing the 
harm, but for which that victimized owner would not be seeking an 
injunction, the effect of which, if issued, would then harm the factory. 
Ignore the temporal aspects of that causal sequence and, indeed, it becomes 
then a matter simply of incompatible and competing uses of scarce 
resources, the solution to which could very well turn on “maximizing social 
wealth” as one among several possible values. But if a court initially, in the 
name of efficiency, allocated the right to the factory by refusing to grant 
the injunction, that result would be achieved at the expense of the no-harm 
principle, properly qualified, that most people think fundamental to justice. 
The factory would not be internalizing the full costs of its actions but 
would be imposing some of those costs on unwilling strangers. Thus, again, 
“what matters” here is more than incompatible and competing uses.42 
Second, although Rothbard does not accept the idea that a court might 
have to impose an efficient solution on the parties where transaction costs 
are high—as in the decisions Zywicki cites, Ploof v. Putnam43 and Alaska 
Packers v. Domenico44—his refinements of his initial “physical invasion” 
premise do not amount to “a multitude of ad hoc exceptions,” as Zywicki 
asserts. In fact, it is causation, a factual matter, and not incompatibility that 
enables the libertarian to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of 
property, whereas incompatibility alone leaves one with only an evaluative 
criterion for making such distinctions. Quiet uses by adjacent owners are 
compatible because they are causally inefficacious. Active uses are 
causally efficacious and hence are compatible with quiet uses or with other 
active uses only if active users internalize the costs they impose on others, 
including through compensation agreements, for which a bedrock causal 
analysis is essential.45 
 
 41 Id. at 317 (emphasis in original). 
 42 I discuss some of these issues more fully in Roger Pilon, Property Rights and a Free Society in 
RESOLVING THE HOUSING CRISIS: GOVERNMENT POLICY, DECONTROL, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 
369–401 (M. Bruce Johnson ed. 1982); reprinted as Property Rights, Takings, and a Free Society, 6 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165 (1983). 
 43 81 Vt. 471 (1908). 
 44 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
 45 I discuss these issues more fully in Property Rights, supra note 42. 
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But finally, if Rothbard’s approach does not amount to a multitude of 
ad hoc exceptions, Zywicki’s “law of necessity”—the very law that 
common law courts have fashioned in decisions like Ploof and Alaska 
Packers—does operate, by Zywicki’s own admission, “as an exception to 
the general rule of property and tort that your property is yours to keep”—
and rightly so, as the facts in those decisions should make clear. The old 
common law judges who fashioned such exceptions over the years may not 
have invoked the language of “bilateral monopolies” or “negative-sum 
rent-seeking transactions,” but their intuitions were on the mark.  
Libertarian legal theory, at its best, does not hold that rights are 
absolute, for the world is too complex and varied to allow for such a 
conclusion. But it does rest on reason, from which rights themselves are 
derived, and it takes reason as far as it will go, after which evaluative 
considerations like those that are inherent in the Coase Theorem, as applied 
in necessity and other such contexts, come into play. It is crucial to 
appreciate, however, just what the order is. It is not that “social wealth 
maximization” is a free-standing base line, as many in the law and 
economics movement would have it. Rather, that criterion comes into play 
in the context of a prior, normatively grounded property rights foundation, 
where pre-existing rights are held “by nature,” to be recognized, not 
“assigned,” by legislatures and courts. And it comes in toward the end, as 
an exception to the normal rules. Deciding precisely when to invoke 
exceptions like the law of necessity is another matter, of course, as is the 
underlying theory of natural rights, but those are matters for another day. 
 
